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suit can be maintained, we do not see why, on the same principle,
similar suits cannot be maintained against purchasers for the value
of hay, corn, potatoes, or fruits raised on the farm and sold. Cer-
tainly it never has been supposed that a suit to annul the convey-
ance of a farm could entail such results. We do not think public
policy, which is the source of the doctrine of lis pendens, requires
that it should entail them. The doctrine is not a favorite of the
courts, and will not be extended without strict necessity : Leiteh v.
Wells, 48 N. Y. 585. It is only because wood is a more perma-
nent part of a farm than its other products that we feel any incli-
nation to entertain the suit. But we are not prepared to enter-
tain it on that account, in the absence of any charge of actual
fraud. We think the comlilainant, if not satisfied with the per-
sonal responsibility of Peter Kiernan and his children, should have
applied for an injunction, or some other preventive order, to protect
her interests.
We must, therefore, sustain the demurrer and dismiss the bill
with costs. Demurrer sustained.
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SUPREME COURT Or THE UNITED STATES.'
SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.
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SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.3
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 4
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 5
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
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ADMIRALTY.
Jurisdiction-Damaqes resulting from Loss of Life-Prohibition.-
While down to a recent period the courts of admiralty have followed
the rule of the common law in deciding that damages could not be
recovered for an injury causing death, yet it is clearly within the power
of the courts of admiralty to determine whether the recent legislation
giving a right of action to those pecuniarily interested in the life of the
person killed, has not wrought a corresponding change in the laws which
Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1881.- The cases will probably appear in 14 or 15 Otto.
2 From John Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 48 Connecticut Reports.
3 From J. H. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 66 Georgia 'Reports.
,4 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter ; to appear in 101 Illinois Reports.
6 s From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter; to hppear in 131 Massachusetts Reports.
6 From E. L. DeWitt, E]sq., Reporter ; to appear in 37 or 38.Ohio St. Reports.
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govern their jurisdiction : Ex yarte Gordon, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term
1881.
A writ of prohibition, therefore, will not be granted to restrain an
admiralty court from proceeding in a cause instituted to recover dam-
ages for loss of life occasioned by a collision : Id.
AGENT.
Building Agreement-Architect-Extra Wor.-A builder made a
written contract to furnish the materials and build a house for the
defendant according to definite plans and specifications, and for a.fixed
sum, all the materials and work to be accepted by an architect named,
who was to superintend the construction. The builder, under the
direction of the architect, did certain work variant from and in addi-
tion to the specifications, which increased the cost and value of the
house. Held, That the ordering of this work was beyond the scope of
the architect's agency, and that the defendant was not liable to the
builder for it : Starkweather v. Goodman, 48 Oonn.
When the house was nearly completed the builder gave the defendant
a written statement of the extra work and materials, to which the latter
made no objection at the time. Held, That h'e -was not estopped thereby
from making the objection afterwards : ld.
ATTORNEY. See Libel; Set-off.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Surety.
Payjment 7-Presumption from Possession of Note-Payment of Inter-
est.-The possession of a promissory note in the hands of the personal
representative of the payee, unexplained, is primafacie evidence that
it has not been fully paid, and when it is produced in evidence,
the burden of proof is on the maker to establish payment, by a pre-
ponderance of evidence : Ritter v. Schenk, 101 Ill.
The payment of interest on the amount claimed to be due when the
note was in fact fully paid, the holder claiming compound interest, will
not conclude the maker from afterwards proving a prior payment in
full, where such payment of interest was made in ignorance of his
rights : Id.
Sale of Note- Warranty of Solvency of Maker.-If a person sells
a promissory note, the maker of which at the time is insolvent, but has
not stopped payment nor been adjudged bankrupt or insolvent, and the
seller does not know of the maker's actual insolvency, the seller does
not warrant the solvency of the maker: Day v. Kinney, 131 Mass.
fOMmON OARRIER.
Limitation of Liability-Railroad-Last Road of Through Line.-
A general stipulation or notice in a bill of lading will not limit the lia-
bility of a common carrier; an express contract is necessary for that
purpose: Georgia R. & B. Co. v Gann, 66 Geo.
An express contract will not protect a common carrier from the results
of its own negligence in running its trains : Id.
Where goods are shipped over a connecting line of railroads, the last
road of the line receiving them as in good order, for transportation, is
liable to the consignee for damages : Id.
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Goods were billed from St. Louis, Missouri, to Athens, Georgia; as
far as Atlanta, Georgia, through rates of freight were paid, and from
Atlanta to Athens loCal rates were charged. Held, That even if this
did not make the Georgia Railroad (from Atlanta to Athens) liable as
the last road of a through line, still the receipt- by it of the goods for
transportation without exceptioi" was impliedly a receipt as in good
order, and would render that road liable for damages occurring thereto:
Id.
COURT.
,Jurisdiction- When it may be Collaterally Attacked.-The jurisdic-
tion of courts of limited and inferior jurisdiction can be collaterally
attacked, and if'the wcnt of jurisdiction in fact exists, the judgment is
an absolute nullity: Calver's Appeal, 48 Conn.
CRIMINAL LAw.
Larceny-Fixtures-'Trespass.-When things attached to the realty
are detached therefrom, they at once become personalty, and are the sub-
ject-matter of larceny even by the person so detaching them : Beal v.
State, 66 Geo.
The difference between simple larceny and one form of trespass is
that the former is the wrongful and fraudulent taking and carrying
away of the personal goods of another with intent to steal the same;
the latter is the taking and carrying away the personal goods or pro-
perty of another without his consent: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Change of Possession.-The defendant, who was in the employment
of .2. upon his farm, bargained with him for the purchase of a horse
which M. had for some time owned and kept on the farm,,wben he
should have earned the money to pay for it. The horse remained on
the farm as before, and two years after N3. sold it to the defendant,
taking his receipt in full for wages'earned in payment. The horse still
remained on the farm and was kept in M.'s stable, the defendant con-
tinuing in his service, and feeding it from M.'s hay and grain as before,
paying a certain sum per week for its keeping. The defendant took
exclusive care of the horse, breaking it to harness, and keeping it shod,
and claiming to own and be in possession of it. About two months
after the sale the horse was attached by one of M. creditors. Held,
that there had been no such change of possession as made the sale good
against the creditors of B.: Bull v. Sigsworth, 48 Conn.
DEED.
Boundaries-Descriptions-Surveyor's Moruments.-It is well-settled
law that the monuments established by a surveyor at the time of mak-
ing the survey will always prevail over written descriptions when a
contradiction exists: People v. Stahl, 101 Ill.
*Any description of land or a lot, for purposes of taxation, by which
it may be identified by it competent surveyor with reasonable certainty,
either with or iithout extrinsic evidence, is sufficient: I1d.
Delivery- What does not amount to -Where a deed is executed and
delivered to a stranger, to be delivered to the grantee, without con-
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ditions, it will be a sufficient delivery to pass the title; but the execu-
tion of a deed, and having it recorded, without the knowledge of the
grantee, is not a delivery: Byars v. Spencer, 101 Ill.
Where a father made and acknowledged a deed to his two minor
children, but retained it until his death, and declined to have it
recorded, on the express ground that he would thereby place the title
beyond his power or control, and expressed an intention, after he had
made and acknowledged the deed, to sell the land if he could get a cer-
tain price, and in pursuance of that intention did offer to sell the land,
it was held that the deed was inoperative for want of a delivery: Id.
Deed Poll-Acceptance of-Liability of Grantee on Covenants.-A
grantee who has accepted a deed poll, by the terms of which he
c assumes and agrees to pay" a certain mortgage on the land " and save
the grantor harmless therefrom," cannot, in an action upon his agree-
ment, no fraud in the execution or delivery of the deed being
suggested, show by oral evidence that he never agreed to assume and
pay the mortgage, nor authorized nor knew of the insertion of such an
agreement in the deed: Muhlig v. Fiske, 131 Mass.
DEVISE.
What passes a Fee-Limitation over upon Failure of Heirs.-A de-
vise by a testator of all of his property of every description, whether
real, personal or mixed, after paying all his just debts, is a devise of the
fee, without the aid of a statute declaring such to be the effect of the
devise: Piatt v. Sinton, 37 or 38 Ohio St.
Where there is a devise in fee, with a provision in the will that in
case the devisee should die without leaving any legitimate heirs of her
body, then the estate should go over to persons named, the fee taken by
the first devisee is determinable only on the contingency of her dying
without leaving such heirs living at the time of her death. Niles v.
Gray, 12 Ohio St. 320, followed : Id.
DURESS.
Threat of Prosecution of Son.-A father may avoid a mortgage
which lie has been induced to sign by threats of the prosecution and
imprisonment of his son : Harris v. Carmody, 131 Mass.
EASEMENT.
Interrupted Ue.-An easement will not arise by prescription, where
the facts show that the owner of the servient estate has habitually
broken and interrupted the use whenever he thought proper to do so:
Kirschner v. West. & Atlatic Railroad, 66 Geo.
Subterranean Right of Way-Construction of Entry across.-The
general rules of law which govern the rights and obligations of the
owners of domirant and servient estates, apply as well to subterranean
rights of way as to those upon the surface: Pomeroy v. Buckeye Salt
Co., 37 or 38 Ohio St.
The owner of coal lands, through which another has a right of way
by subterranean entry to reach coal mines in an adjoining tract, may
lawfully construct an entry crossing such right of way, provided it be
done without destroying or substantially interfering with the use
thereof: Id.
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EJEOTMENT.
Mesne Profits-.Voluntary Division of Profits between Contestants.-
Where two parties each claimed an interest in land under a will, and
with full knowledge of all the facts connected therewith, collected and
voluntarily divided the rents and profits, in a subsequent action of
ejectment by one against the other, he cannot recover such mesne
profits: White v. Rowland, 66 Geo.
EQUITY. See Set-off
Judgment Lien- Want of Notice .to Defendant-Actual Knowledge.
-A court of equity will not decree a judgment lien to be invalid on
the ground of the want of legal notice to the defendant, where the
plaintiff has not been guilty of misconduct and the defendant had
actual knowledge of the pendency of the action, unless a meritorious
defence to the action be shown: Gifford v. Morrison, 37 or 38 Ohio
St.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Admission of Improper Evidence-Equity-Pesumptio .- An error
in admitting the evidence of an incompetent witness on the hearing of
a chancery case, is no ground of reversal when the record contains
other evidence which is competent and sufficient to sustain the decree:
Ritter v. Schenk, 101 Ill.
In chancery cases it will be presumed that the court disregarded
incompetent evidence on the hearing, especially where there is com-
petent evidence on which to base its decree : Id.
Reduction of Damages on Appeal.-On error to reverse a judgment
in damages, for a breach of contract, where a motion for a new trial
based on the ground of an erroneous charge, and because the verdict is
unsupported by the law and the evidence, is overruled, and the evidence
is part of the record ; and where it appears that the verdict is too
large, by reason of error of the court in its rulings, or of the jury, and
there is nothing necessarily implying passion or prejudice in the jury,
the court .may, where it can be done, ascertain from the evidence the
amount of such excess, and may, on a remittitur of the same being
entered, affirm the judgment as modified: C. & A!. Railroad Co. v.
Himrod .Mrnace Co., 37 or 38 Ohio St.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See Judicial Sale.
Purchase by at Tax Sale.-An administrator of an estate, having no
power or control over rhe land of his intestate, and not being required
to pay the taxes thereon, may rightfully become the purchaser of the
same, as against the heirs, at a sale for the taxes thereon, and set up
his deed as color of title, under the Statute of Limitations : Stark v.
Brown, 101 Ill.
FORMER RECOVERY.
Suit for Interest-When not a Bar to Suit for Pincifpal.- Where a
note is given, payable in one year, with interest payable semi-annually,
and a suit brought two years thereafter to recover the instalments of
interest then due, and a recovery therein, such judgment will be no bar
to a subsequent action on the note to recover the principal. In such
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case, the promise to pay interest is a distinct, cause of action from the
promise to pay the principal. Each promise constitutes a aistinct cause
of action : Dulaney v. Payne, 101 Ill.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Agreement to pay Li n on Vessel for Debt of former Owner.-If the
owner of a vessel, subject to a lieu for a debt incurred by a former
owner, agrees to pay the lien, on the holder of the lien forbearing to
enforce the same, this is not a promise to pay the debt of another,
within the Statute of Frauds : Fears v. Story, 131 Mass.
INSURANCE.
Forfeiture-NonTayment of Premium Note- Omission of Notice-
sage-Parol Agreement in Contradiction of Policy.--'If, in a policy
of insurance, a forfeiture is provided for in case of non-payment of
premium at the day specified, the courts cannot grant relief against it.
The insurer may waive it, or by his conduct lose his right to enforce
it; but that is all: Thompson v. -nickerbocker Life Ins. Co., S. 0. U.
S., Oct. Term 1881.
While the taking of a note for the premium is a waiver of'the
primary candition of forfeiture for non-payment, yet, if there is also a
condition by which the policy was to be void if the note was not paid,
the non-payment of the note will work a forfeiture: Id.
A usage on the part of the company of giving notice of the falling
due of premiums, is no excuse for non-payment upon a failure to receive
such notice: Id.
A parol agreement, made at the time of issuing the policy, contra-
dicting the terms of the policy itself is void, and cannot be set up to
contradict the policy : Id.
A usage of the company not to demand punctual payment of the
premiums, but to give days of grace, is a mere voluntary indulgence
which dannot be construed as a permanent waiver of the clause of for-
feiture, or as implying any agreement to continue the indulgence : Id.
Even if such circumstances were sufficient to lay ground for reliev-
ing from the forfeiture, a subsequent tender of the premium is necessary.
and a failure to make such a tender will defeat plaintiff's recovery: Id.
The payment of the annual premium is not a condition precedent to
the continuance of the policy. It is a condition subsequent, the non-
performance of which may incur a forfeiture of the policy, br may not,
according to the circumstances. It is always open to the insured to
show a waiver of the condition, or a course of conduct on the part of
the insurer which gave him just and reasonable grounds to infer that a
forfeiture would not be exacted. But it must be just and reasonable
ground, one on which the insured has a right to rely: .7d.
INTEREST. See Former Recovery.
JUDICIAL SALE.
.Executor's Sale-Caveat Fm tor.-The doctrine of caveat emptor
applies to an administrator's or executor's sale, and a purchaser thereat
cannot repudiate his bid because of a defective title or want of title in
the intestate, when there is no fraud or misrepresentation by the
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administrator or executor. Nor will equity enjoin a resale at the pur-
chaser's risk on his refusal to comply with his bid: Jones v. Warnock,
66 Geo.
LEGACY.
Gft to a 6lass- Who are included.-The general rule with regard
to legacies to a class of persons is, that those only who are embraced in
the class at the time the legacy takes effect will be allowed to take:
Jones's Appeal, 48 Conn.
But where a legacy of that kind takes effect in point of right at one
time, and in point of enjoyment at another, the general rule is that all
those will take who are embraced in the class at the time the legacy
takes effect in point of enjoyment : Id.
A testator gave certain property to his son for life, and after his
death to his children equally. When the testator died the son had a
wife fifty-nine years of age and three adult children, but the wife after-
wards died and the son married again, and had two more children, who
were living at his death. Held, that these children were entitled to
share equally with the others in the property given by the will : Rd.
LBEr. " *
Statement by Counsel-When not Privileged.-A defamatory state-
ment contained in the declaration in an action, signed by counsel, if
not pertinent or material to the issue, is not privileged ; and, in an
action of libel against the counsel, he cannot justify by showing his
belief that it was true, the sources of his information, or his instruc-
tions from his client: i fLanghli v. Cowley, 131 Mass.
T ALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
ETnforcement of Afortgage in violation of Agreement-Action for-
Darnages.-If a mortgage-creditor contract with his debtor not to
enforce his mortgage within a given time, but subsequently does so,
and levies on the property of the debtor, the latter has the right to sue
for the actual injury occasioned him thereby, without alleging malice or
want of probable cause: Jitehter v. Boehm, 
66 Geo.
A right of action exists in all cases of malicious abuse of legal pro-
cess, or its use without probable cause. In such cases punitive damages
may be added to the actual damage sustained 
: Id.
In an action for damages for the wrongful seizure and sale, under
color of legal proceedings, of a tradesman's stock, while profits which he
was making may not be recovered as such, yet their amount may be
proved and considered by the jury as a fact in estimating the magnitude
of the injury done: -d.
Generally, counsel fees do not form a part of the damages recover-
able in action for tort, but if the defendant has acted in bad faith, or
been stubbornly litigious, or caused the defendant unnecessary trouble
and expense, they may be allowed by the jury, and may be proved for
that purpose: Id.
MASTER AND SE VANT.
Term of Employment-Hiring by Year-'When -inferred.-Where
one rendering service for another under a monthly employment, says to
his employer that he desires to have his employment made more per-
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manent, and thereupon a specified amount per year is agreed upon,
payable in semi-monthly instalments, a hiring of a year may be inferred.
Express words that the employment should continue for a year are not
essential: Bascom v. Strillito, 37 or 38 Ohio St.
MITNES. See Easement.
MORTGAGE. See Duress.
Neglect to Record-Postponement of in Favor of subseguent Lien.-
The existence and common use of a public office for the recording of
mortgages imposes a duty on a mortgagee to record his mortgage, and
on a failure to do so he will be postponed to a subsequent bona fide
mortgagee without notice, even though there be no statute requiring
mortgages to be recorded: Neslin v. Wells, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
Assumption of by Purchaser-Action by .Mortgagee.-Where one
purchases real estate encumbered by a mortgage, and agrees to pay the
mortgage-debt as a part of the consideration, the promise may be en-
forced by the mortgagee. Aliter if the conveyance in which the
promise is inserted is itself a mortgage: Bassett v. Bradley, 48 Conn.
MUNICIPAL BONDS. See Constitutional Law.
Authority to Efxecute under Seal- Omission of Seal- Validit.-A
statute authorizing a town to subscribe to a railroad, provided, as follows:
"It shall be lawful for the said commissioners to borrow on the faith
and credit of the said town such sum of money as the tax-paying in-
habitants shall fix upon by their assent in writing * * * and to execute
bonds therefor under their hands and seal." .Held, that the require-
ment of a seal was directory merely, and that the omission of a seal
did not invalidate bonds issued under the act: Draper v. Town of
Springport, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
MUNICIPAL CORPORA'ION.
Power to License Trades-Limited to those enumerated in the Statute.
-Where the legislature, by the General Incorporation Act, declares
that the corporate authorities of cities and villages organized and acting
under its provisions shall have power to license certain occupations and
kinds of business, specifically enumerating them, such declaration, by a
familiar rule of construction, must be construed precisely as if the law,
in ekpress terms, inhibited the licensing of all trades and occupations
not contained in the enumeration : City of Cairo v. Bross, 101 Ill.
NEGLIGENCE.
Injury by successive Negligent Acts of two Persons-Right of one pay-
ing Damages to recover from the other.--If a person leaves a hatchway
in the sidewalk connected with his premises in an unsafe condition, so
that an injury to a traveller on the street is liable to happen in con-
sequence of it, and another person so interferes with the hatchway as
to cause it to be more dangerous, and a traveller is injured by the hatch-
way, the occupant of the premises is in par delicto with the other
person, and cannot recover indemnity of him, if compelled to pay
damages recovered in an action by the injured person: Churchill v.
Holt, 131 Mass.
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PATENT.
Re-issue-Enlargement of Claim-When inadmissible-A claim can
only be enlarged by a re-issue when an actual bona fide mistake has
been inadvertently committed-such as a court of chancery would
correct: Miller v. The Bridgeport Brass Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1881.
In reference to such re-issues the rule of laches should be strictly
applied, and no one should be relieved who has slept upon his rights
and has thus led the publie'to rely on the implied disclaimer involved
in the terms of the original patent. And when this is a matter ap-
parent upon the face of the instrument, upon the mere comparison of
the original patent with the re-issue, it is competent for the courts to
decide whether the delay was unreasonable, and whether the re-issue
was therefore invalid: 1.
Re-issue- 'hen invalid-lew Patent for same Invention-Process-
Use by Government-Suit against Offcer.-If a patent fully and clearly
describes and claims a specific invention, complete in itself, a re-issue
cannot be had for the purpose of expanding the claim to embrace an
invention not specified in the original : James v. Campbell, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1881.
A patentee cannot claim in a patent the same thing claimed by him
in a prior patent, nor what he omitted to claim in a prior patent in
which the invention was described, he not having reserved the right to
claim it in a separate patent and not having seasonably applied there-
for: Id.
A patent for a machine cannot be re-issued for the purpose of claim-
ing the process of operating that class of machines: Id.
The government of the United States has no right to use a patented
invention without compensation to the owner of the paten.t: Id.
Query, whether an officer of the government can be sued for using
an invention only for and in behalf of the government, and whether
the Cdurt of Claims 'is not the only tribunal in which the claim for
compensation can be prosecuted: Id.
POSSESSION.
Record of Judgment in Action by Landlord against Tenant-Con-
clusiveness as to Tenant's Possession.-The record of a judgment in a
summary process for the recovery of leased premises by A. againsL B.,
is conclusive evidence against B. and his grantees that he was in pos-
session at the time as the tenant of A.: Richmond v. Stahle, 48 Conn.
And proof that he was in such possession up to the boundary line
of the demised premises: Id.
.AILROAD. See Receiver.
RECEIVER.
Not liable to Suit without leave of Court-Power to Operate and
Repair Railroad-Suit in Foreign State.-A receiver in possession of
a xailroad, and by order of the court engaged in the business of a common
carrier thereon, cannot, without leave of the court, be sued for injury
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to persons or property caused by his negligence or that of his servants:
Barton v. Barbour, S. 0. U. S., October Term 1881.
If the adjustment of the demand involve questions of fact, the court
may, in the exercise of its legal discretion, either of its own motion or
on the demand of the party injured, allow him to sue the receiver in a
court of law or direct a feigned issue : Id.
A court of equity may authorize the receiver of a railroad to keep
the same in repair and to operate it in the ordinary way until it can be
sold to the best advantage of all interested: Id.
In such case, a court of another state has not jurisdiction without
leave of the court by which the receiver was appointed, to entertain a
suit against him for a cause of action arising in the state in which he
was appointed, and in which the property in his possession is situated,
based on his negligence or that of his servants in the performance of
their duty in respect to such property: 1d.
Certificates for Indebtedness of Railroad-Priority-Estoppel.-If
the holder of railroad bonds secured by trust deeds on the road, having
notice of the appointment, of a receiver, and an order of court directing
him on his petition to issue certificates of indebtedness on which to
raise money to discharge a chattel mortgage on the personal property of
the company, and to pay taxes, current expenses, &c., and making such
certificates a -prior and first lien on all the property of the company,
desires to question the power of the court to make such order, he must
do so before such certificates are issued and sold to bona fide purchasers,
or paid out to creditors of the company. After their issue and sale, it
will be too late for him, or purchasers from him with notice of the facts,
to raise the question whether the subject-matter to which the certificates
were applied was within the scope of the power of the court in the
preservation of the property for the benefit of all concerned : Hum-




Motion to set-off one Judgment against another-Attorneys' Fees pro-
tected.-A motion that one judgment be set-off against another is an
appeal to the equitable powers of the court, to be granted or refused
upon consideration of all the facts ; and in granting such motion, the
claim of the attorneys for fees will be respected, wherever it appears to
be right, in view of the facts, that this should be done: Diehl v.
Friester, 37 or 38 Ohio St.
SHIPPING.
Replevin by Part Owner.-A part owner of a vessel cannot maintain
replevin for his undivided part,' although he owns a major interest in the
vessel : .ackett v. Potter, 131 iass.
SUBROGATION.
Purchaser from Heir without Administration-Payment of Debts out
of the Proceeds.-If an heir, to whom lands descend subject to the debts
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of his ancestor, sells the same with covenants of general warranty at
private sale, without administration on his ancestor's estate, to a bona
fide purchaser, who applies the purchase-money to discharge liens thereon
created by the ancestor, and to the payment of preferred claims, such
purchaser is in eqfuit entitled, in the distribution of the purchase-
money, to be subrogated to the rights and equities of the holders of
such claims; Sidener v. Jawes, 37 or 38 Ohio St.
SURETY.
For Agent of Insurance Company- Omission of Compavy to Collect
Balances due.-An agent of an insurance company gave a bond, with
sureties, to the company, conditioned for the faithful performance of his
duties as agent, according to the by-laws of the company. A by-law
required that the agents of the company should render, monthly ac-
counts, and pay each month the balance due to the company. The agent
rendered his accounts regularly : but, one month did not pay the whole
balance due from him, and, thereafter, for more than a year his indebt-
edness to the company increased from month to month until it exceeded
the penal sum in the bond, when, for the first time, the sureties were
notified. Held, That tiaese facts did not discharge the sureties: Water-
town Pire Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 131 Mass.
Agreement with _Principal to reduce Rate of Interest.-A memoran-
dum made by the holder on the back of a promissory note, to the effect
that the rate of interest after a certain day 'Will be less than that stated
in the body of the note, is not an alteration of the note, and does not
discharge a surety of the maker, although written in pursuance of an
agreement between the holder and the maker of the note without the
knowledge of the surety : Cambridge Savings Bank v. Hygde, 131 Mass.
TAX.
Personal Judgment for Taxes-Effect upon the Lien.-The recovery
of a personal judgment by the state, against the owner of real estate for
taxes due thereon, does not discharge the lien given by the statute for
such taxes, and hence is no bar to an application by the collector
for judgment against the property. The state may have a personal
judgment against the owner for the taxes, and at the same time, or at
any other time, enforce payment against the land itself by a proceeding
in i'em; but the payment of either judgment will be a satisfaction of
both: People v. Stahl, 101 Ill.
TRADEMARK.
Character of Word used-Injunction.-A trademark, to be protected
from infringement, must designate the origin or ownership of the article
to which it is applied. A mere general description by words in com-
mon use, of a kind of article or its nature and qualities, cannot of itself'
become a trademark: Larrabee v. Lewis, 66 Ga.
" Snowflake," as applied to bread or crackers, is a mere description
of whiteness, lightness and purity: Id.
An arbitrary word, riot descriptive of the character or quality of the
article to be sold, may be used to designate particular goods, and may
become a trademark: Id.
In Georgia, to have a word or words claimed as a trademark pro-
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tected by injunction from use by another, it should appear that the
defendant's use of them was with the intent to deceive or mislead the
public : Id.
TRUST.
Conveyance for use of Wife and lildren-Power of Sale-Bona
file Purchser.-Where a deed conveyed land to the wife of the
grantor for her use for life, provided that it should be used by the
grantor's children together with his wife as a home, and at her death
be divided among them, and with power in the wife "at any time in
her discretion to sell and convey the said property by deed, provided
the proceeds of such sale are invested in other real estate for the uses
expressed," a bona fide purchaser from the wife would acquire a good
title, and would not be bound to see to the application of the proceeds:
Guill v. Northern, 66 Geo.
Use of Tust F ands by Tr'ustee- Compound Interest.--Where a trustee
refuses to account for the profits arising from his use of the money, or
has so mingled it with his own that he cannot separate and account for
the profits that belong to the cestui que trust, the latter is allowed com-
pound interest. This rule applies especially to cases involving a wilful
breach of duty: State v. Rowarth, 48 Conn.
UNITED STATES. See Patent.
WILL.
Failure to establish Will after Caveat- Costs against Propounder-
Liability of Legatees.-Where a will is propounded and caveat is filed,
upon failure to establish the will, the court cannot go further than to
enter up judgment for costs against the propounder. Though parties
beneficially interested as legatees may have aided the propounder by
employing counsel and subponaing witnesses, they are not such parties
to the record as that a judgment for costs can be entered against them
Prances v. Holbrook, 66 Geo.
Whether one who propounds a will at the instance or for the benefit
of another can recover from the latter by assumpsit the costs which he
had incurred by failing to establish the will, Qu.ere? Id.
Destruction of-Evidence as to Contents-Sanity -Where a will
duly executed and attested was destroyed, with the connivance of a part
of the heirs of the testator, and no copy appeared to be in existence,
in a suit by a devisee not a party to such destruction, it was held, that
the latter was only required to show, in general terms, the disposition
which the testator made of his property by the instrument, and that it
purported to be his will, and was duly attested by the requisite number
of witnesses: Anderson v. Irwin, 101 Ill.
On a bill to establish a will destroyed after the testator's death,
proof of the sanity of the testator is not indispensable in the absence
of any proof that he was not in his sound mind, and in such case the
disposition made by him of his property may of itself afford sufficient
evidence of his sanity: Id.
